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1The headline in January 26th's U.S. News and World Report read: Tobacco
Fighters Find Another Smoking Gun. New Documents Dim Settlement Hopes.'
A few days earlier, Representative Henry Waxman, a leading tobacco oppo-
nent, released internal R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company documents produced
between 1973 and 1990, many marked secret or condential, which apparently
describe the company's eorts to attract new young smokers to R.J. Reynolds
brands such as Camel.2 The documents included such recommendations as If
our company is to survive and prosper, over the long term we must get our
share of the youth market, and The brand must increase its share penetration
among the 1 4-to-24 age group.3
As indicated by the headline, the release of the documents, with their impli-
cations of intentional attempts by the tobacco industry to target minors, hurt
the industry's chances for congressional approval of the sweeping settlement of
state lawsuits seeking to recoup health care costs,4 a settlement that includes a
host of advertising and promotion restrictions intended to prevent just such a
targeting of minors. Among such tobacco advertising restrictions are a ban on
the use of human images and cartoon characters in all advertising, a ban on all
billboard and
1Marianne Lavelle, Tobacco Fighters Find Another Smoking Gun. New
Documents Dim Settlement Hopes, US. News & World Report, January 26,
1998.
2See Id.
3See Id. RJR claims that the memos are taken out of context ant that some
mentions of underage smokers are the result of typographical errors. See Id.
See Id. Among those skeptical of the settlement is Senate Majority Leader
Trent Lott, who recently expressed doubts that the package would pass Congress.
See Id.
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2outdoor advertising, and a restriction of print advertising to black text on a
white background (except for advertising in adult-only facilities and publications).5
These advertising restrictions essentially reect expanded versions of regulations
that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) proposed in August 1995 and
issued on August 28, 1 996,.6 which the tobacco, advertising, and convenience
store industries have been ghting in court since the release of the proposed
rule on the grounds that 1.) the FDA does not have the authority under the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to regulate tobacco products (including
their advertising and promotion) and 2.) that the restrictions are an uncon-
stitutional restraint of free speech in violation of the First Amendment.7 With
the settlement, these important questions and challenges were somewhat put to
rest, for under the terms of the settlement, the tobacco companies eectively
agree to accept the authority and constitutionality of the advertising restrictions
by dropping their case against the FDA's regulations.8
However, the issues of FDA authority to regulate tobacco advertising and
the constitutionality of the restrictions will not remain dormant. The damaging
R.J. Reynolds documents are the latest indications that the once heralded to-
bacco settlement may fail to receive the Presidential and Congressional approval
necessary for it to take eect. If this occurs, the lawsuit against the regulations
will continue, and questions of authority and constitutionality of
5See Douglas J. Wood, Will Bans on Tobacco Ads Pass Muster? The Na-
tional Law Journal, July 7, 1997, at B9.
621 C.F.R. 801 et seq. and 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 et seq.
7Coyne Beahm Inc. v. FDA, 966 F.Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997)
8See Wood, supra note 5, at B9.
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3tobacco advertising will rise to the forefront. Additionally, even if the settlement
is approved by federal legislation, other factors may result in such issues being
raised irrespective of the settlement's approval. This discussion will attempt to
explore the controversy and dynamics of FDA authority over tobacco advertis-
ing and the constitutionality of the existing (although unapproved) restrictions
on tobacco advertising, the two major obstacles to the rm establishment of
government limitations on the tobacco industry's commercial speech.
I. BACKGROUND
The restrictions on advertising contained within the landmark tobacco set-
tlement began as FDA proposals to regulate tobacco products. In February of
1994, responding to a petition asking it to regulate low-tar and low-nicotine
cigarettes, the FDA began to seriously consider the question of whether it had
jurisdiction over nicotine-containing tobacco products.9 Throughout the follow-
ing year, testimony is heard before various committees in Congress concerning
the addictive properties of nicotine and its relation to the conduct of tobacco
companies, culminating in an announcement by President Clinton of the pro-
posed FDA rule to reduce the access and appeal of tobacco products to children
in August 1995.10 Public comment periods were open and closed, and nally,
on August 23, 1996, President Clinton announced the publication of the nal
FDA rule as part of a program to prevent children and adolescents from smoking
cigarettes or using smokeless tobacco.'1
The FDA's nal regulations are based upon studies and data that the agency
gathered
9FDA Press Release, August 23, 1996.
'0See Id.
115ee Id.
4concerning the addictive properties of nicotine and the use of tobacco prod-
ucts by children.'2 Based on this information, the FDA claims to assert jurisdic-
tion over tobacco products as combination products under the FDCA consisting
of both a drug component (nicotine) and a device component (tobacco, ventila-
tion system, lter, etc.) that delivers the drug.'3 Rather than an outright ban
of tobacco products, the FDA determined that the best way to regulate tobacco
to protect the public health is to focus on preventing children and adolescents
from becoming addicted.' This goal is to be achieved by limiting access to to-
bacco products and reducing the appeal of tobacco advertising.'5 Restrictions on
access to children and adolescents include federal minimum age requirements,
bans on vending machines, self-service displays, free-samples, and packages with
less than 20 cigarettes.'6 The specic advertising provisions limit the appeal of
tobacco products to children by:
1. Prohibiting billboards within 1,000 feet of schools and playgrounds.
2. Permitting only black text on a white background for print media
with signicant youth readership (15% or more than 2 million readers under
18).
3. Prohibiting sale or giveaways of non-tobacco products (like caps, gym
bags, Tshirts, etc.) or services that carry tobacco product brand names or logos.
4. Prohibiting brand-name, logo, or color sponsorship of any sporting,
cultural, or other event but permitting sponsorship by corporate name.
In September of 1995, shortly after the publication of the proposed rules,
the tobacco, advertising, and retail industries collectively led suit challenging
the FDA's authority to
'2See Executive Summary, Final Rule (1996) '3See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 at
33,397 (1996) 'See Executive Summary, Final Rule 'tmSee Id.
'6See Id.
4
5regulate tobacco products and the constitutionality of the regulations.'7 District
Court judge Osteen decided on April 25, 1997, two months before the tobacco
settlement was nalized, that the FDA did have authority to regulate tobacco
products but not their advertising or marketing under the FDCA.'8 Given its
nding that the FDA lacked authority under the FDCA to restrict the promotion
and advertising of tobacco products, the court in Coyne Beahm declined to
determine whether the promotion and advertising restrictions violate the First
Amendment. Both the FDA and the tobacco companies appealed the decision
in to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which is still considering the case,
leaving the FDA authority and constitutionality issues open for the time being.
Two months later, a potential solution to the authority and constitutionality
problems came in the form of what is probably the largest settlement in the
history of litigation. While part of the tobacco industry was litigating the
Coyne Beahm case in the district court, other tobacco industry representatives,
along with private lawyers and attorney generals representing 40 states, were
negotiating the settlement of the state and private class-action lawsuits against
the major tobacco companies seeking recovery for state Medicaid funds and
health problems from smoking. The settlement, announced on June 20, 1997,
would dismiss the existing state and private class-action suits against tobacco
companies and provide immunity from future suits in exchange for payment of
$368.5 billion over 25 years, preservation and acceptance of FDA
'7See Covne Beahm Inc. v. FDA. 966 F.Supp. 1374 (M.D.N.C. 1997)
'8See Id. Judge Osteen's decision was on plaintis motion for summary
judgment. Osteen certied the case for interlocutory appeal, since the case
involves controlling questions of law as to which there is substantial ground for
dierence of opinion. Id. at 1400.
'9See Id. at 1400, n33.
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6authority over tobacco products as drugs and devices by withdrawal of the
Coyne Beahm appeal and its challenge to agency regulations, and submission
to a number of restrictions regarding youth access to tobacco products and
tobacco advertising.20 Although advertising restrictions embodied in the set-
tlement basically reect the FDA' s Final Rule, there are some amended and
additional limitations that signicantly increase the burden on speech.2' The
settlement would:
1. Restrict print advertising to black text on a white background (no
color or images), except for advertising in adult-only facilities and publications.
2. Ban all non-tobacco merchandise bearing the name, logo or selling
message of a tobacco brand.
3. Ban sponsorship of events in the name, logo, or selling message of
tobacco products.
4. Ban oers of non-tobacco gifts based on proof of purchase of tobacco
products.
5. Ban the use of human images and cartoon characters in all tobacco
advertising or on packages.
6. Ban all outdoor and billboard advertising of tobacco products, in-
cluding stadium posters and point of sale ads (window signs, etc.)
7. Ban Internet tobacco advertising in the United States.
8. Prohibit direct or indirect payments for tobacco product placements
in movies, television programs, or video games.22
II. THE TOBACCO SETTLEMENT, FDA AUTHORITY OVER
TOBACCO ADVERTISING, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
This settlement, if approved by Congress and the President, would alleviate
some of the tensions over FDA authority to regulate advertising and the con-
stitutionality of advertising restrictions. First of all, by dropping its appeal in
the Covne Beahm case, the tobacco companies
20Henry Weinstein, $368 Billion Tobacco Accord Deal With States Would
Restrict Marketing, Los Angeles Times, June 21, 1997, at Al.
2'See Id.; and Wood, supra note 5.
22Restrictions 1 through 3 are essentially the same as the FDA's regulations,
but 4 through
8 represent new or modied restrictions.
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7are implicitly accepting the FDA regulations issued in 1996, essentially allowing
the FDA to have unchallenged authority to regulate tobacco advertising (as well
as tobacco products in general).23 Moreover, without the tobacco industry's
legal challenge through the Coyne Beahm appeal, the constitutionality of the
regulations may also go unchecked.2
However, this acceptance of FDA authority and advertising restrictions is
dependent upon the passage of federal legislation which, at least for now, seems
remote.25 The smoking gun documents from R.J. Reynolds are only the latest
in a series of events that cast doubt upon the prospects for congressional and
presidential approval. From the day the settlement was announced, a number
of critics have voiced concerns about the leniency of the settlement and how
cigarette companies will emerge better o from the deal than they would if
no settlement was reached, since business will remain highly protable.26 The
Federal Trade Commission helped to conrm such critics' fears when it released
a report saying that cigarette makers could realize substantial prots by raising
cigarette prices above levels needed to nance the $368.5
23Critics have indicated that although tobacco companies agree to nicotine
regulation, the legal burden established in the settlement to justify reduction in
nicotine levels (substantial evidence) is so high that no reductions will occur.
Nonetheless, FDA authority under Coyne Beahm will stand, and the FDA will
have its authority to regulate tobacco products as drugs and devices.
2Although the District Court in Coyne Beahm declined to examine the con-
stitutionality of the FDA rules, if the tobacco industry continues in its appeal,
the issue would likely be addressed by the 4th Circuit or the Supreme Court.
25Felix H. Kent, Reviewing 1997: Tobacco Settlement, New York Law Jour-
nal, December 19, 1997, at 3.
26Myron Levin, Tobacco Foes Scour Pact for Smoke and Mirrors Settlement,
Los Angeles Times, June 22, 1997, at Al.
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8billion in payments under the settlement.27
Among such critics were former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop and former
FDA Commissioner David A. Kessler, who were concerned that the settlement
placed too heavy a legal burden on the FDA to justify control over nicotine con-
tent, since it was written in such a way that makes it virtually impossible for
the FDA to regulate nicotine.28 Koop and Kessler soon urged lawmakers in con-
gressional hearings on the settlement to reject the plan and instead implement
an aggressive tobacco control program which includes granting the FDA explicit
authority to regulate nicotine, but their proposals were met with skepticism.29
President Clinton also shares some of Koop and Kessler's concerns as well,
for he refused to embrace the settlement and stated that he sought to build
on it, suggesting ve key elements that must be part of any national tobacco
legislation.30 Clinton only strengthened his position with the recent release of
the R.J. Reynolds documents.3'
Other factors have also complicated eorts to nalize the tobacco settlement.
With the delay in Congress and White House approval of the settlement, a
number of states in the
27Brett D. Fromson, Tobacco's Quiet counteroensive; PR Eort Seeks to
Blunt Criticism That Settlement Wouldn't Hurt Them, The Washington Post,
October 10, 1997, at A02.
285ee Levin, supra note 26. Comments by David A. Kessler.
29John Schwartz, To Anti-Tobacco Advocates, Issue is Anything But Settled;
Koop, Kessler propose Control Plan; Senate Skeptical, The Washington Post,
July 30, 1997, at GOl.
30Myron Levin, Clinton Ups the Anti-Tobacco Ante, Los Angeles Times,
September 18,
1997, at Al.
31From Associated Press, Clinton Urges Congress to Join Anti-Tobacco Bat-
tle, Los Angeles Times, January 18, 1998, atA2O.
8
9settlement are likely to face pressures to separately settle with the tobacco com-
panies, thus weakening the settlement as a whole. These pressures are only
increased with the release of the R.J. Reynolds documents and the beginning
of a Minnesota lawsuit, which promises to make public mor damaging indus-
try documents.32 Additionally, conicts over the source of lawyers' fees33 and
whether federal Medicaid costs (in addition to state Medicaid) should be reim-
bursed from the settlement3 have further dimmed the hopes for an approved
settlement.
Clearly, if the tobacco settlement deal collapses, the questions of FDA au-
thority over advertising and First Amendment violations will surface, as to-
bacco companies deny the legal basis and constitutionality of any governmental
advertising limitations and the Covne Beahm appeal continues. It is equally
important to address these issues even if the settlement is likely to be approved,
however, for their emergence may be inevitable, as parties outside the settlement
have incentives to challenge FDA authority over advertising and the constitu-
tionality of any restrictions.
A foreign tobacco company not a party to the settlement or a nonparticipat-
ing company to the settlement may assert that the deal also unconstitutionally
restricts its speech. Although nonparticipating companies are not technically
held to the restrictions of the settlement but rather grouped into a separate
regime, that separate regime apparently amounts to substantial payments
325ee Lavelle, supra note 1.
33Saundra Torry, Billions of Dollars in Lawyers' Fees Become Hot Issue in
Tobacco Settlement, The Washington Post, January 17, 1998, at A09.
3Attorneys General Tell President They Want All of Tobacco Settlement, 11
No. 6 Mealey 's Litigation Reports: Tobacco, November 20, 1997.
9
10in lieu of speech restrictions, thereby establishing a price for free speech.35 Such
payments may be viewed as direct burdens on speech and would likely prompt
a First Amendment challenge.
Additionally, nonparticipating competitors of the industry-leading compa-
nies in the tobacco settlement may recognize possible benets to the few largest
companies involved in the settlement and may themselves challenge the adver-
tising restrictions. Indeed, the restrictions would make it hard to introduce new
brands or sell less popular brands, brands which may depend upon the more
ashy, colorful, stylish advertising and dierent venues (billboards, outdoor,
etc.) to attract and retain new customers.36 While limiting the prospects for
smaller tobacco rms, the restrictions in the settlement would simultaneously
allow well-established tobacco brands to reduce costs on advertising and promo-
tion without much fear of reducing consumer loyalty or appeal, for the barring
and limiting of venues will forcefully reduce promotional costs for all companies
yet keep all advertisements at roughly the same limited, competitive level.
III. FDA AUTHORITY TO REGULATE TOBACCO AND TO-
BACCO ADVERTISING
The FDA' s alleged authority to regulate tobacco advertising begins
with its assertion that
nicotine in cigarettes and smokeless tobacco is a drug, and cigarettes and
tobacco products are nicotine delivery devices under the FDCA.37 Essentially,
the FDA claims that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are intended to aect the
structure or function of the body, within the meaning
355ee Wood, supra note 5.
36Denise Gellene, The Tobacco Settlement: A New Frontier Is Opening Up
for Cigarette Ads, Los Angeles Times, June 21, 1997, at Dl.
375ee 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 at 44,397 (1996).
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11of the FDCA's denitions of drug and device. The nicotine in cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco is a 'drug' which produces signicant pharmacological ef-
fects in consumers, including satisfaction of addiction, stimulation, sedation,
and weight control. Cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are combination products
consisting of the drug nicotine and device components (tobacco, lters, etc.)
intended to deliver nicotine to the body.38 Given their combination product
status, cigarettes and smokeless tobacco could be regulated as a drug or a de-
vice, and the FDA chose to regulate under the FDCA's device authorities.39
More specically, the FDA draws its advertising restrictions from the restricted
medical device provisions.0 Since the FDA's authority to regulate tobacco ad-
vertising is predicated upon an initial nding ofjurisdiction over nicotine and
tobacco products. it would prove fruitful to examine some of the issues con-
cerning FDA authority over tobacco in general before addressing the regulation
of advertising in particular.
Review of the FDA's construction of the FDCA generally follows the analysis
set forth in Chevron. U.S.A.. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc.,
which sets out a two step process.' One must begin by determining whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue or expressed a
clear intent to allow or withhold jurisdiction, for [i]f the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter.2 If the statute is silent or ambiguous with
381d.
391d. at 44,399.
01d. at 44,399.
'467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2Id at 842.
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12respect to the specic issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.3 These guidelines
translate into two basic questions concerning tobacco product regulation. First,
has Congress expressed a clear intent to either permit or deny the FDA jurisdic-
tion over tobacco products? If there is no congressional intent, then is the FDA's
reading of the FDCA, such that nicotine and tobacco products are together a
drug delivery device and combination product, a permissible interpretation of
the statute?
A. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The FDCA does not contain any specic reference to authority over tobacco,
so both opponents and proponents of FDA authority look elsewhere. Proponents
argue that the FDA has been granted broad authority by Congress commensu-
rate with its vital mandate to protect the public health and safety. Congress
obviously knew in 1938 that it could not foresee future developments, and that
it must proceed primarily by establishing general principles, permitting imple-
mentation within broad parameters, if regulation in this important area was to
be eective. In this respect, the Act must be regarded as a constitution. It
establishes a set of fundamental objectives...The mission of the Food and Drug
Administration is to implement those objectives through the most eective and
ecient controls that can be devised.5
While opponents may grant that, in general, the FDCA does have a constitution-
like quality to it, they would point to a number of indications that Congress has
intended to withhold
31d. at 843.
James T. O'Reilly, Tobacco and the Regulatory Earthquake: Why the FDA
Will Prevail After the Smoke Clears, 24 N Ky. L. Rev. 509, 514 (1997).
5Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal Food Drug
& Cosmetic Act, 28 Food Drug Cosm. L. J 177, 178-79 (1973).
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13from the FDA the power to regulate tobacco. The history of failed attempts
within Congress to enact legislation to place tobacco products within the reach
of the FDA serves as the rst major indication that Congress does not intend
to grant the FDA authority.6 The Covne Beahm court responded, on the other
hand, that unenacted bills generally provide rather unpersuasive evidence of
congressional intent.
Critics of FDA authority also indicate that Congress, through the enact-
ment of legislation that granted certain authority to regulate tobacco products
to other agencies (especially the FTC in regards to tobacco product advertise-
ment), has intentionally reserved the authority to regulate tobacco products.8
Opponents typically cite such laws as the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Adver-
tising Act, the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Education Act, and the Alco-
hol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Reorganization Act of 1992 as examples.9
While such laws do indicate congressional intent in each particular instance,
the FDA and proponents would argue that each law is limited to its own struc-
ture, history, and specic provisions such that Congress, in enacting and later
amending the three statutes, adopted narrow preemption language, evidencing
its intent not to prohibit other agency action in the area.50
Finally, opponents of regulation are quick to point out that since 1914, the
FDA's
6John E. Jevicky, Esq., FDA's Regulation of Tobacco Products: A Flagrant
Disregard of Congressional Intent, 24 N Ky. L. Rev. 535, 53 7-40 (1997).
~966 F.Supp. at 1382.
8See Jevicky, supra note 46, at 541.
~966 F.Supp. at 13 84-88.
50966 F.Supp. at 1388.
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14historical interpretation of the FDCA has been that it lacks any authority to reg-
ulate tobacco products.5' Indeed, there is evidence not only that FDA previously
asserted that it lacked jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products as customarily
marked, but also that some members of Congress agreed with FDA and intro-
duced legislation to expressly grant FDA jurisdiction, legislation which failed
to be enacted.52 Conceivably, this not only indicates that the FDA's present
position is contradictory and inconsistent, but that Congress has accepted the
FDA's previous assertions that it lacks authority, and its intent to is to remain
faithful to those claims.
The FDA and its proponents oer equally valid arguments, though. In par-
ticular, they assert that the change results not from a new interpretation of
the FDCA, but from application of its longstanding interpretation to new ev-
idence, information and understanding about tobacco and nicotine addiction
which now justify FDA authority over tobacco products.53 It seems reasonable
that an agency should be able to adapt its polices and not be frozen in a time
warp according to the knowledge of 1906 or 1938, until and unless special legis-
lation added each new drug to the agency's list of regulable entities.5 Addition
ally, the Covne Beahm court indicated that congressional acquiescence to or
ratication of agency policy would not necessarily connote approval or disap-
proval of the agency's later alteration of that policy...[Since] [e]ven if Congress
acquiesced to FDA's assertion of lack ofjurisdiction, such acquiescence would
not
515ee Jevicky, supra note 46, at 543-4
52966 F.Supp. at 1382.
~~966 F.Supp. at 1384.
5See O'Reilly, supra note 44, at 526.
14
15necessarily connote Congress' opposition to FDA's [present] assertion ofjurisdiction.55
B. FDA'S ASSERTION OF JURISDICTION UNDER THE FDCA
DRUG AND DEVICE DEFINITIONS
The FDCA denes a drug, in relevant part, as articles (other than food)
intended to
aect the structure or any function of the body.56 Similarly, the Act denes
a device, in
relevant part, as an instrument...or other similar or related article...which is
intended to aect the structure or any function of the body.57 The FDA argues
that, based upon evidence of the
addictive and pharmacological eects of nicotine, nicotine can be regulated
as a drug, and, thus, tobacco products can be regulated as a combination prod-
uct or drug delivery device.58
The major issues here, given the mounting evidence over the years of nico-
tine's eects
on the body,59 have not involved whether nicotine may have an eect on the
structure or function of the body, but whether tobacco products are intended
to have an eect on the body.60 At the
~~966 F.Supp. at 13 83-84.
5621 U.S.C.A. x321(g)(1)(c) (1996).
~~2l U.S.C.A. x321(h)(3) (1996). 585ee 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,399.
595ee, e.g., 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,854-912.
60There is another subtle and less discussed, but signicant issue: Whether
the device
component of tobacco products are technically devices. Opponents have
claimed that tobacco products are not devices because they do not themselves
aect the structure or function of the
body, and even if they do aect the body, they fall within the FDCA exception
for products that achieve their primary purposes through chemical action within
the body. See 966 F.Supp. at
1394-95. Covne Beahm recently ruled that each of the products in a combination
device does not have to be capable of being separately regulated, and that a
combination product, as opposed to
device, can achieve its primary purpose by chemical action within the body. See
966 F.Supp. at
1395.
15
16heart of the controversy is a disagreement over the proper means to measure a
manufacturer or vendor's intent.
Tobacco companies and opponents to regulation indicate that the requisite
intent to aect the body exists only if the manufacturers or vendors make health
claims about their products or it may be inferred from the labeling, promotional
material, advertising, and any other relevant source.6' Indeed, in the past, the
FDA has asserted jurisdiction over tobacco products only when they were ac-
companied by therapeutic claims.62 Given such an interpretation, regulation
opponents would indicate that there is no evidence that tobacco companies pro-
mote, market, or intend tobacco products to aect the structure or function
of the body. Rather, tobacco products are intended for smoking pleasure, and
there is no evidence from the labels, advertisements, and promotional materials
to suggest otherwise.63 Moreover, evidence suggests that teenagers do not use
tobacco to aect the structure or function of the body but rather for psychoso-
cial reasons.6 For teenagers, smoking may be as a social smoker, to enhance
image, or to experiment with the taboo, not to aect the body.65
615ee Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 239 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (where the court concluded that the FDA's decision to refrain from
asserting jurisdiction was warranted since there was no evidence that cigarette
manufacturers or vendors represent to consumers that cigarettes are intended
to aect the structure or function of the body).
625ee Lars Noah and Barbara A. Noah, Nicotine Withdrawal: Assessing the
FDA's Eort to Regulate Tobacco Products, 48 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 10 n34 (1996).
635ee Jevicky, supra note 46, at 548.
6See Philip Rohde Costello, Put This In Your Pipe and Smoke It: FDA
Regulation of Tobacco Products, 4] N XL. Sch. L. Rev. 703, 714 (1997).
655ee Id.
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17The FDA measures intent quite dierently. It suggests that intent may be
satised by
evidence of a consumer's actual use and the manufacturer's knowledge of
that use, regardless of whether the manufacturer made any health claims,66
a suggestion which the Coyne Beahm court accepted.67 Under such an expan-
sive interpretation, intent could be inferred if there is evidence of consumers'
use to aect the structure and function of the body (including addiction and
other pharmacological eects) and the manufacturer's knowledge of such use.
Proponents readily
have such evidence at hand, with studies of nicotine addiction and some
evidence that manufacturers have been aware of nicotine's aects on the body.68
Nonetheless, basing the regulation of products on actual consumer use and
manufacturer knowledge may prove too much of a stretch of the jurisdictional
denitions. Under the FDA's construction of the Act, if a manufacturer of wool
coats becomes aware that a consumer wears its wool coat, not because it keeps
him warm, but because he likes the smell and feel of the coat and that it makes
him feel good to war it, all of which aect his senses and thereby his
psychological well-being, i.e., functions of the body, it could be regulated as
a drug.69
C. RESTRICTED MEDICAL DEVICES AND ADVERTISING RE-
STRICTIONS
The specic advertising restrictions are promulgated under the FDA'
s authority to
regulate restricted medical devices.70 The FDA wishes to regulate tobacco
products as medical
665ee 61 Fed. Reg. at 45,203
67966 F.Supp. at 1389.
685ee 61 Fed. Reg. at 45,203 and 41,483.
695ee Jevicky, supra note 46, at 550.
~~61 Fed. Reg. at 44,399.
17
18devices, and restricted medical devices in particular, because it can potentially
assert authority over the advertising, sale, and other aspects of the cigarette
market without having to impose an complete ban, as might be expected under
regulation as a drug.7' The restricted devices provision allows the FDA to:
.require that a device be restricted to sale, distribution, or use {
(A.) only upon the written or oral authorization of a practitioner
licensed by law to administer or use such device, or
(B.) upon such other conditions as the Secretary may prescribe in such regu-
lation, if, because of its potentiality for harmful eect or the collateral measures
necessary to its use, the Secretary determines that there cannot otherwise be
reasonable assurance of its safety and eectiveness.72
The rst question raised by the FDA' s attempt to use the restricted de-
vices provision to restrict advertising and promotion would naturally address
whether the FDA' s restriction to sale, distribution, or use includes advertising
or promotion. The FDA asserts that advertising is an oer for sale, and thus is
part of the sale of a product, for the sale is linked inextricably to the advertising
that promotes the sale.73 If the law were otherwise, advertising could attract
children in such a way as to undermine all of the other conditions on sale and
distribution.7
The court in Coyne Beahm disagreed, however, and stated that the ordinary
denition of sale did not encompass advertising.75 Additionally, Judge Osteen
reiterated the arguments of the tobacco company plaintis by noting that al-
though Congress expressly used the words 'oer
715ee Costello, supra note 64, at 723.
7221 U.S.C.A. x360j(e) (1996).
735ee 61 Fed. Reg. at 44406.
7See Defendant's Opposition Brief. Coyne Beahm. Inc. v. FDA.
755ee 966 F.Supp. at 1398.
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19for sale' and 'advertising' or 'advertisements' elsewhere in the FDCA, it chose
not to use such a language in x 360j(e).76
Even if the phrase sale, distribution, or use allowed restriction of advertising
as part of an oer for sale, can the other conditions as the Secretary may pre-
scribe, which must be met by manufacturers or vendors in order for the FDA
to permit such limited sale, distribution, or use, be read to include conditions
on advertising? In other words, even if the FDA had the authority to require
certain other conditions as prerequisites to permitting tobacco advertising, can
such other conditions include restrictions on advertising and promotion? (For
example, compare the FDA requiring a certain nicotine content before allowing
advertising, with a regulation that will only allow advertising if it is black and
white text. If this still sounds a bit confusing, it is likely due to the FDA' s at-
tempt to restrict speech in a context not originally designed for such restrictions,
as we shall see)
Both the FDA and its opponents engaged in a study of the legislative history
and related provisions to determine the answer to this question.77 The FDA's
opponents argued that the restricted devices provision should be read in con-
text with other provisions, the rst being x353(b), which limits certain drugs
(as opposed to devices) to prescription sale, indicating the medical context of x
320j(e). ~ Moreover, a look at the legislative history indicated an even stronger
medical context in which x 320j (e) was to be interpreted, for the other sug-
gested limits, in addition to prescription status, included use only in hospitals
or clinics and
76Id
See Defendant's Opposition Brief& 966 F.Supp at 1399.
785ee 966 F.Supp. at 1399.
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20authorization of certain devices by nurses and technicians.79 Tobacco companies
also indicated that other provisions existed which directly addressed the regula-
tion of advertising of restricted devices, thus denying such a broad reading of x
360j(e).80 The FDA's position simply states that x 3 60j (e) can and should be
interpreted separately from the other sections to yield a more expansive reading,
and that the other claimed advertising provisions cannot be used to regulate the
advertising of restricted devices.8'
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ADVERTISING REGULATIONS
(FDA Rules and Settlement Provisions)
Although the United States has a long history of extending First Amendment
protections, the Supreme Court did not recognize First Amendment protection
for commercial speech until 1975.82 83 In 1980, the Court nally delineated a
means to determine whether the First Amendment had been violated in relation
to commercial speech. In Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission,8
the Court established a four-part test that continues to be the standard today:
1.) Is the speech protected by the First Amendment? For commercial speech
to receive
795ee 966 F.Supp. at 1399, fn 27.
805ee 966 F.Supp. at 1399, & fn 28. These regulations included x 352(q)
and x 352(r).
8'See Defendant's Opposition Brief.
82Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
835ee Scott Joachim, Seeing Beyond the Smoke and Mirrors: A Proposal
for the Abandonment of the Commercial Speech Doctrine and an Analysis of
Recent Tobacco Advertising Regulations, 19 Hastings Comm/Ent LI 517 (1997)
for a discussion of the illusory commercial/noncommercial speech distinction.
84447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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21protection, it must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. 2.) Is the
government interest in regulation substantial? 3.) Does the regulation directly
and materially advance the governmental interest asserted? 4.) Is the regulation
narrowly tailored such that it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest?85
A. Lawful and Nonmisleading
With the current release of documents concerning the targeting of minors
by tobacco
86
companies, proponents of speech restrictions are likely to claim that tobacco
advertisements are
both unlawful and misleading. The advertisements may be unlawful in the
sense that they relate to and encourage the illegal purchase of tobacco products
by minors.87 However, a court is unlikely to nd them unlawful, for without good
proof (which remains to be seen) that the tobacco industry targets children, the
speech may be seen as relating to the lawful activity of adult tobacco purchase
and consumption.88 The possibility of misleading speech is also rather rare, for
mere puery would not suce as misleading, 89 and claims in advertisements
are dicult to classify as simply true or false.90 Indeed, if intended targets such
as Joe Camel and the Marlboro Man are found misleading under this standard,
virtually every modern
85447 U.S. at 566
865ee Lavalle, supra note 1,
875ee Defendant's Opposition Brief.
885ee Kathleen J. Lester, Cowboys, Camels, and Commercial Speech: Is
the Tobacco Industry's Commodication of Childhood Protected by the First
Amendment? 24 N Ky. L. Rev. 615, 649 (1997).
89Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983).
905ee Lester, supra note 87, at 650.
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22advertisement would be misleading as well.9'
B. Substantial Government Interest
The FDA regulations (and additional settlement limitations) aim to decrease
young people's use of tobacco products by ensuring that the restrictions on ac-
cess are not undermined by the product appeal that advertising for these prod-
ucts creates for young people.92 Certainly, it is dicult to imagine how this
laudable interest, or any, asserted government interest can be found insubstan-
tial. Deference is almost always given to the asserted state interest. The state's
interest or motive can rarely be contradicted, since it is what the state says
it is. The real concern occurs with the means chosen to achieve this interest.
Thus, for our purposes we can safely assume that a substantial interest would
be found.
C. Directly and Materially Advances Asserted Interest
Although courts grant deference to the nding of a substantial interest, they
do require that the regulations further this interest in a direct and material
way.93 The burden is not satised by mere speculation and conjecture; rather a
governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in
fact alleviate them to a material degree.9
In endeavoring to meet this burden, the FDA presented a wealth of evidence
and studies
915ee Joachim, supra note 83, at 551.
9261 Fed. Reg. at 44,465.
93Edeneld v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).
941d. at 770-71.
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23regarding the importance of advertising as a factor in tobacco use by minors.95
While the FDA suggests that this evidence indicates a relationship between
advertising and use of tobacco products by children,96 others suggest that the
studies only indicate a correlation and not a direct causal link.97 Certainly, it
is conceivable that the link between advertising and use by children is strong
enough that the regulations would decrease underage smoking by some amount,
thus suggesting a somewhat direct link.
However, that begs the question of whether the restrictions would advance
the government interest to a material degree. If one considers the host of reg-
ulations and restrictions as a whole, material advance of the state interest is
likely. However, such an aggregate approach to the requirement of material ad-
vancement seems inappropriate, for individually immaterial burdens on speech
may be able to pass muster collectively, thus doing what they could not do indi-
vidually. Moreover, it is necessary under this third prong that the government
to establish this amount, be it big or small, for it must prove advancement
to a material degree. It is unclear whether the FDA has met this burden of
production.
D. Narrowly Tailored
Assuming that the regulations and restrictions directly and materially ad-
vance the government interest, the nal inquiry under the Central Hudson test
determines whether the regulations are narrowly tailored so that they are not
more extensive than necessary to serve [the
955ee 61 Fed. Reg. 44,488.
965ee Id.
97Gregory D. Bassuk, Advertising Rights and Industry Fights: A Consti-
tutional Analysis of Tobacco Advertising Restrictions in a Federal Legislative
Settlement of Tobacco Industry Litigation, 85 Geo. L.J. 715, 730 (1997)
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24governmental] interest.98 [I]f the governmental interest could be served as well
by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions
cannot survive.99 Aside from such basic guidelines, there appears to be much
room for interpretation. On one end of the spectrum, the Court has stated
that [t]his requirement is less than the least restrictive 'a On the other end, it
recently abandoned the reasonable t standard.'0' Thus, it would seem that
the standard review for this prong ranges from a least restrictive means test
to a reasonable
102
ith no co
t inquiry, w nsensus on what modied version of the Central Hud-
son test will be
applied in future decisions.'03 Additionally, the fourth prong may be the
most dicult to evaluate in this situation because of the need to ascertain the
relationship between tobacco advertising and use by children, a problem encoun-
tered earlier with direct and material advancement of governmental interests.
With such uncertainty, it would be dicult to evaluate any of the FDA
Rules' or tobacco settlement's advertising restrictions with any surety as to
validity. However, a brief analysis would serve to indicate whether each of the
restrictions are more or less likely to pass constitutional muster. Of the original
FDA Rule restrictions and the settlement, only the black
98447 U.S. at 566.
991d. at 564.
'00Fox v. University of New York, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
See 44 Liquormart v. Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) and Rubin
v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S.Ct. 1585 (1995).
'025ee Bassuk, supra note 97, at 733.
'035ee Lester, supra note 87, at 646.
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25text on white background restriction would seem relatively certain to survive
constitutional scrutiny. It does allow relevant informational speech and free-
dom from restrictions in adult only publications. The other restrictions seem
to approach the bounds of constitutionality if not cross them. Banning the
non-tobacco merchandise, sponsorship of events, use of human and cartoon im-
ages, all outdoor and billboard advertising10 Internet advertising in the U.S.,
and product placements in movies or television all seem too encompassing of
acceptable speech and make no real attempt to nd less restrictive versions of
the limitations.
CONCLUSION
The landmark tobacco settlement promised a great deal when it rst ap-
peared last summer, seeking to settle lawsuits and nally place some restrictions
on the tobacco industry. At the time, issues of FDA authority and constitu-
tionality of advertising restrictions seemed to be put to rest in the afterglow of
the settlement. However, as time passes, a settlement seems less and less likely,
necessitating a look at these issues of authority and constitutionality, issues that
may occupy the nation's attention in the coming months.
'Although, the original FDA Rules which had a within 1000 feet of schools
clause may be narrowly tailored.
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